chore(main): release 8.3.0 - #1465
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📦 Container Size AnalysisNote Comparing 📈 Size Comparison Table
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✅
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| Descriptor | Linter | Files | Fixed | Errors | Max errors | Warnings | Elapsed time |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ✅ ACTION | actionlint | 23 | 0 | 0 | 0.09s | ||
| ✅ DOCKERFILE | hadolint | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0.15s | ||
| ✅ JSON | npm-package-json-lint | yes | no | no | 0.26s | ||
| ✅ JSON | prettier | 46 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 1.17s | |
| ✅ JSON | v8r | 46 | 0 | 0 | 11.0s | ||
| ✅ MARKDOWN | markdownlint | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.52s | |
| ✅ MARKDOWN | markdown-table-formatter | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.12s | |
| ✅ REPOSITORY | betterleaks | yes | no | no | 0.75s | ||
| ✅ REPOSITORY | checkov | yes | no | no | 19.47s | ||
| ✅ REPOSITORY | git_diff | yes | no | no | 0.01s | ||
| ✅ REPOSITORY | grype | yes | no | no | 53.17s | ||
| osv-scanner | yes | 1 | 4 | 1.62s | |||
| ✅ REPOSITORY | secretlint | yes | no | no | 0.74s | ||
| ✅ REPOSITORY | syft | yes | no | no | 1.78s | ||
| ✅ REPOSITORY | trivy | yes | no | no | 9.17s | ||
| ✅ REPOSITORY | trivy-sbom | yes | no | no | 0.23s | ||
| ✅ REPOSITORY | trufflehog | yes | no | no | 2.37s | ||
| lychee | 119 | 1 | 0 | 47.07s | |||
| ✅ YAML | prettier | 36 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0.42s | |
| ✅ YAML | v8r | 36 | 0 | 0 | 5.85s | ||
| ✅ YAML | yamllint | 36 | 0 | 0 | 0.77s |
Detailed Issues
⚠️ SPELL / lychee - 1 error
📝 Summary
---------------------
🔍 Total..........154
🔗 Unique.........126
✅ Successful.....147
⏳ Timeouts.........1
🔀 Redirected......19
👻 Excluded.........0
❓ Unknown..........0
🚫 Errors...........1
⛔ Unsupported......1
Errors in .github/TOOL_VERSION_ISSUE_TEMPLATE.md
[403] https://developer.arm.com/downloads/-/arm-gnu-toolchain-downloads (at 38:7) | Rejected status code: 403 Forbidden
[TIMEOUT] https://ubuntu.com/about/release-cycle (at 8:90) | Request timed out
Hint: Followed 19 redirects. You might want to consider replacing redirecting URLs with the resolved URLs. Use verbose mode (`-v`/`-vv`) to see redirection details.
Hint: You can configure accepted/rejected response codes with `-a` or `--accept`
⚠️ REPOSITORY / osv-scanner - 1 error
warning: Package 'brace-expansion@5.0.7' is vulnerable to 'CVE-2026-14257' (also known as 'GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg').
= CVE-2026-14257: brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded expansion length causing an out-of-memory process crash
= ### Summary
`expand()` bounds the *number* of results it produces (the `max` option,
`100_000` by default) but not their *length*. By chaining many brace groups,
an attacker keeps the result count under `max` while making every result grow
with the number of groups. Building `max` long results — plus the intermediate
arrays combined at each brace group — exhausts memory and crashes the Node
process with an **uncatchable** out-of-memory error. `try/catch` around
`expand()` does not help: the fatal error terminates the process.
A ~7.5 KB input (`'{a,b}'.repeat(1500)`) is enough to crash a default Node
process.
### Details
For `N` chained brace groups such as `'{a,b}'.repeat(N)`:
- the result count is `2^N`, immediately capped at `max` (`100_000`), so the
`max` protection appears to hold, but
- each result is `N` characters long, so the total output size is
`max × N` characters, which grows without bound in `N`.
`expand_` combines each brace set with the fully-expanded tail:
```js
const post = m.post.length ? expand_(m.post, max, false) : ['']
...
for (let j = 0; j < N.length; j++) {
for (let k = 0; k < post.length && expansions.length < max; k++) {
const expansion = pre + N[j] + post[k] // grows one group longer per level
...
expansions.push(expansion)
}
}
The loop guard expansions.length < max limits how many strings are built, but
nothing limits how long they get. Each recursion level materializes another
array of up to max strings, one character longer than the level below, and —
because V8 represents pre + N[j] + post[k] as a cons-string (rope) that
references post[k] — those intermediate strings stay reachable through the
whole chain. Memory therefore scales with max × N.
Measured on 5.0.7 ('{a,b}'.repeat(N), default max):
| groups (N) | input bytes | result count | peak RSS |
|---|---|---|---|
| 20 | 100 | 100,000 | ~80 MB |
| 50 | 250 | 100,000 | ~214 MB |
| 100 | 500 | 100,000 | ~409 MB |
| 300 | 1,500 | 100,000 | ~1,148 MB |
| 1500 | 7,500 | — | OOM crash |
Proof of concept
const { expand } = require('brace-expansion')
// ~7.5 KB input — crashes the process with a fatal, uncatchable OOM:
// FATAL ERROR: ... JavaScript heap out of memory
try {
expand('{a,b}'.repeat(1500))
} catch (e) {
// never reached — the process is already dead
}Impact
Any application that passes attacker-influenced strings to
brace-expansion.expand() — directly, or transitively via minimatch / glob
brace patterns — can be crashed by a small request. Because the failure is a
fatal V8 out-of-memory error rather than a thrown exception, it cannot be caught
and it takes down the whole worker/process, denying service.
Remediation
Upgrade to a patched release. The fix bounds the total number of characters a
single expand() call may accumulate (EXPANSION_MAX_LENGTH, default
4_000_000, configurable via a new maxLength option), applied inside the
output-building loops so intermediate arrays are bounded too. Once the limit is
reached, output is truncated — consistent with how max already truncates —
instead of growing without bound. The limit sits well above any realistic
expansion (100,000 results hitting max measure ~1M characters), so legitimate
input is unaffected.
After the fix, '{a,b}'.repeat(1500) returns a bounded, truncated result in
~0.7 s using ~340 MB and never crashes, including under a constrained 512 MB
heap.
The fix bounds memory but the algorithm still rebuilds intermediate arrays at
each level (roughly O(N × maxLength) work on this input class). A streaming
rewrite that produces output in O(total output size) can be a non-urgent
follow-up.
If immediate upgrade isn't possible, avoid passing untrusted input to
expand() / glob brace patterns, or pass a small explicit max and
maxLength.
warning: Package 'brace-expansion@5.0.7' is vulnerable to 'CVE-2026-69152' (also known as 'GHSA-rgw5-rvv9-x895').
= CVE-2026-69152: brace-expansion: DoS via unbounded intermediate arrays, bypassing the CVE-2026-14257 mitigation
= ### Summary
The maxLength mitigation added in 5.0.8 for GHSA-mh99-v99m-4gvg / CVE-2026-14257 is incomplete. It bounds the accumulator where results are combined, but not the intermediate arrays that feed it. A ~25 KB input still crashes the Node process with an uncatchable out-of-memory error, so try/catch around expand() does not help.
A second, related path in the same function lets a ~400 KB input block the event loop for over two minutes without ever exceeding the memory bound.
Details
maxLength was enforced in combine(), the single place output grows. Two arrays are built before combine() runs, and neither was bounded.
1. Comma alternatives accumulate without a running total (memory exhaustion)
Each alternative in {a,b,c,...} is expanded by its own recursive expand_() call, so each receives a full, independent maxLength allowance. The results were then concatenated into a single values array with no cumulative limit:
values = []
for (let j = 0; j < n.length; j++) {
values.push.apply(values, expand_(n[j], max, maxLength, false))
}
acc = combine(acc, pre, values, max, maxLength, ...)With A alternatives, values can reach A * maxLength characters before combine() gets a chance to truncate it. At the default maxLength of 4,000,000 and 400 alternatives, that is well past any default heap.
2. Padded sequences ignore maxLength while generating (CPU exhaustion)
expandSequence() was bounded by max (the result count) but never consulted maxLength. A padded sequence's element width follows the input, so {0...01..100000} with a wide pad generates max elements, each as wide as the input, only for combine() to discard all but a handful.
Memory stays flat here, because V8 represents the padded strings as cons-strings, which is likely why this path was not caught alongside the original issue. The cost is time: work proportional to max * width.
| pad width | input bytes | results kept | time (5.0.8) | time (patched) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20,000 | 20 KB | 199 | ~7.3 s | ~20 ms |
| 100,000 | 100 KB | 39 | ~32 s | ~20 ms |
| 400,000 | 400 KB | 9 | ~124 s | ~18 ms |
Output is byte-identical before and after the fix; only the wasted work is removed.
Proof of concept
Memory exhaustion, against 5.0.8:
import { expand } from 'brace-expansion'
const part = '{' + '0'.repeat(50) + '1..100000}'
const input = '{' + Array(400).fill(part).join(',') + '}' // ~25 KB
try {
expand(input)
} catch (e) {
// never reached - the process is already dead
}FATAL ERROR: Ineffective mark-compacts near heap limit Allocation failed - JavaScript heap out of memory
Aborted
Event-loop stall, against 5.0.8:
import { expand } from 'brace-expansion'
// ~400 KB input, returns 9 results after roughly two minutes of blocking CPU
expand('{' + '0'.repeat(400_000) + '1..100000}')Impact
Denial of service. Any application that passes attacker-controlled input to expand(), directly or transitively through a glob or pattern-matching library, can be remotely crashed or stalled. The out-of-memory variant terminates the process and cannot be handled with try/catch.
Applications already on 5.0.8 are affected: the 5.0.8 mitigation does not cover these paths.
Patches
Both intermediate arrays are now bounded as they are built, using the same max and maxLength limits already applied in combine():
valuestracks a running result count and character length while alternatives are appended, and stops once either bound is reached.expandSequence()acceptsmaxLengthand stops generating once the sequence's own characters reach it.
As with the existing limits, output is truncated rather than allowed to grow without bound, which matches how max already behaves. The defaults sit well above any realistic expansion, so legitimate input is unaffected.
Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, avoid passing untrusted input to expand() or to glob brace patterns, or pass an explicitly small max and maxLength.
Note that a small maxLength alone was not sufficient on affected versions: it was applied per alternative rather than cumulatively, which is the root of the first issue above.
Credits
The memory-exhaustion bypass was reported by Alessio Della Libera, CEO & Co-founder at Numyra.
The sequence-generation issue was found while verifying that report.
warning: Package 'bare-metal@0.2.5' is vulnerable to 'RUSTSEC-2026-0110'.
= RUSTSEC-2026-0110: bare-metal is deprecated
= The bare-metal crate has been deprecated and archived.
For Mutex and CriticalSection, see the critical-section crate instead.
warning: Package 'bare-metal@0.2.5' is vulnerable to 'RUSTSEC-2026-0110'.
= RUSTSEC-2026-0110: bare-metal is deprecated
= The bare-metal crate has been deprecated and archived.
For Mutex and CriticalSection, see the critical-section crate instead.
warning: 4 warnings emitted
</details>
See detailed reports in [MegaLinter artifacts](https://github.com/philips-software/amp-devcontainer/actions/runs/35598118820)
You could have the same capabilities but better runtime performances if you use a MegaLinter flavor:
- [oxsecurity/megalinter/flavors/salesforce@v10.1.0](https://megalinter.io/10.1.0/flavors/salesforce/) (58 linters)
Your project could benefit from a custom flavor, which would allow you to run only the linters you need, and thus improve runtime performances. (Skip this info by defining `FLAVOR_SUGGESTIONS: false`)
- Documentation: [Custom Flavors](https://megalinter.io/10.1.0/custom-flavors/)
- Command: `npx mega-linter-runner@10.1.0 --custom-flavor-setup --custom-flavor-linters ACTION_ACTIONLINT,DOCKERFILE_HADOLINT,JSON_V8R,JSON_PRETTIER,JSON_NPM_PACKAGE_JSON_LINT,MARKDOWN_MARKDOWNLINT,MARKDOWN_MARKDOWN_TABLE_FORMATTER,REPOSITORY_CHECKOV,REPOSITORY_GIT_DIFF,REPOSITORY_BETTERLEAKS,REPOSITORY_GRYPE,REPOSITORY_OSV_SCANNER,REPOSITORY_SECRETLINT,REPOSITORY_SYFT,REPOSITORY_TRIVY,REPOSITORY_TRIVY_SBOM,REPOSITORY_TRUFFLEHOG,SPELL_LYCHEE,YAML_PRETTIER,YAML_YAMLLINT,YAML_V8R`
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📦 Container Size AnalysisNote Comparing 📈 Size Comparison Table
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📦 Container Size AnalysisNote Comparing 📈 Size Comparison Table
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📦 Container Size AnalysisNote Comparing 📈 Size Comparison Table
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📦 Container Size AnalysisNote Comparing 📈 Size Comparison Table
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📦 Container Size AnalysisNote Comparing 📈 Size Comparison Table
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🤖 I have created a release beep boop
8.3.0 (2026-09-21)
Features
Chores
513c074to9559cebin amp-devcontainer-base (#1467) (dd2bf5e)This PR was generated with Release Please. See documentation.