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Persist inbound Create activities and link their deliveries - #120
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The inbox listener now stores a received Create, with its remote actor and object, when Fedify has authenticated it and it meets DrFed's rules: it has an ID, its object is a Note or an Article with content, on its actor's origin and attributed to it as FEP-fe34 requires, its actor has an inbox, and its text is storable. The activity and its embedded object are stored as received, found through JSON-LD expansion whatever terms, graphs or containers the document uses. An IRI already stored is reused under a lock, and a Create already stored writes nothing. Every inbound delivery that was verified and answered with 2xx is linked to the activity its recorded IRI names, duplicates Fedify skips included, from both the synchronous recorder and the queue worker; an outbound delivery is linked to the activity it sends. The GraphQL schema adds Activity.deliveries, filtered before paging to the instances the viewer may read, and ActivityDelivery.activity. Remote actors keep their preferredUsername as received, so Actor.username and Actor.handle become nullable, and username constraints apply only to local actors. The test "rejects a verified Create claiming an IRI on another origin" is marked todo: Fedify 2.4.1 still accepts an activity ID on another origin than its actor. It is expected to pass once DrFed updates to the next Fedify security release, which rejects such activities with 401. AI provenance: The user wrote a plan to resolve #88 and asked Claude Code to implement the plan and then address review findings on lockfile consistency, duplicate writes, JSON-LD object extraction, lock ordering, and unstorable text. Claude Code wrote the implementation, migration, tests, and documentation, reproduced the deadlock and its fix against PostgreSQL 17 in a container, and ran the build, checks, and all tests. Codex reviewed the changes. The user also reviewed and verified them. Fixes #88 Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5-5 Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6-astra
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No actionable comments were generated in the recent review. 🎉 ℹ️ Recent review info
📝 Walkthrough
Merge Risk: 🔵 Low · up to This change stores inbound Create activities and controls who can read them through GraphQL. No blocking defects remain open. One migration may block writes to the deliveries table for longer on large deployments while its new constraints are validated. Operators should plan for that during upgrades. Pre-merge checks |
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.oxlintrc.json disables the repository-wide eslint/max-statements and import/max-dependencies rules. This configuration change does not implement issue [#88] or the current PR intent. The other … |
Revert the two global rule changes in .oxlintrc.json. Keep only focused lint suppressions that the implementation requires, or retain the existing warning rules. |
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Check name Status Explanation Title check The title clearly summarizes the primary change: persisting inbound Create activities and linking their deliveries. Description check The description directly explains the persistence, delivery-linking, GraphQL, actor, testing, and dependency changes. Linked Issues check Issue [ #88] coding requirements are met. The inbox listener validates authenticatedCreateactivities, supported actor and object types, actor attribution, FEP-fe34 origin, storable content, and rem…Docstring Coverage Docstring coverage is 87.10% which is sufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 62 functions across 48 files. (6 skipped: 6…
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.oxlintrc.jsondisables the repository-wideeslint/max-statementsandimport/max-dependenciesrules. This configuration change does not implement issue [#88] or the current PR intent. The other reported changes have a stated connection to delivery linking, activity persistence, visibility, actor representation, security verification, or their tests and documentation.
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Review comments at
@packages/models/drizzle/20261010044954_link_activity_deliveries_to_activities/migration.sql:
- Around line 6-7: Add both constraints in the migration as NOT VALID, then add
a later migration that validates the activity_deliveries foreign key and actors
check constraint. Keep validation out of the original migration so its
transactional locks are not held during the constraint scans.
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📒 Files selected for processing (42)
.oxlintrc.jsonCONTRIBUTING.mdpackages/drfed/src/index.tspackages/drfed/src/lifecycle.test.tspackages/federation/README.mdpackages/federation/package.jsonpackages/federation/src/activity-delivery/inbound.tspackages/federation/src/activity-delivery/outbound.tspackages/federation/src/activity-delivery/queue.tspackages/federation/src/activity-delivery/tracking.tspackages/federation/src/federation.test.tspackages/federation/src/inbox-persist.tspackages/federation/src/inbox.tspackages/federation/src/index.tspackages/federation/src/task-queue.tspackages/graphql/README.mdpackages/graphql/src/activity-delivery/activity.test.tspackages/graphql/src/activity-delivery/entry.tspackages/graphql/src/activity-delivery/inbox-fixture.test.tspackages/graphql/src/activity-delivery/persist.test.tspackages/graphql/src/actor.test.tspackages/graphql/src/actor.tspackages/graphql/src/builder.tspackages/models/README.mdpackages/models/drizzle/20261010044954_link_activity_deliveries_to_activities/migration.sqlpackages/models/drizzle/20261010044954_link_activity_deliveries_to_activities/snapshot.jsonpackages/models/package.jsonpackages/models/src/activity-delivery.test.tspackages/models/src/activity-delivery.tspackages/models/src/index.tspackages/models/src/instance.test.tspackages/models/src/instance.tspackages/models/src/relations.tspackages/models/src/resource.test.tspackages/models/src/resource.tspackages/models/src/schema.tspackages/models/src/text.tspackages/web/src/actor.tspackages/web/src/components/ActorCard.tsxpackages/web/src/components/ActorDetail.tsxpackages/web/src/routes/workspace/create/[instance_id]/objects.tsxpnpm-workspace.yaml
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Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5-5
The copy button next to an actor's heading was shown only when the actor had a handle, while the heading falls back to the actor IRI for a remote actor without preferredUsername. The button is now always shown and copies the same value the heading displays, with an accessible label that names what it copies. #120 (comment) Claude Code applied the change from the review plan the contributor approved. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5-5
activity_deliveries.activity_id only guaranteed that the activity existed. recordInbound() accepted an activityId and stored it without checking, so a caller could link an unverified or rejected delivery. InboundDeliveryEntry no longer takes activityId, leaving linkInboundActivity() as the only way to link an inbound delivery, and the new activity_deliveries_activity_check constraint refuses a linked inbound row unless it is verified and received or acknowledged. IRI equality with the linked activity stays with linkInboundActivity(). #120 (comment) Claude Code applied the change and its migration and tests from the review plan the contributor approved. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5-5
The inbox listener looks for the embedded object of a received Create in at most MAX_PROBES (64) places of the document, expanding it once for each. When the object lay beyond them, the object and the activity were stored, but Object.document was silently null, while the description promised that both were stored as received. Extraction is now documented as best effort rather than a condition of storing: the MAX_PROBES comment, the federation README, and the description of Object.document state that such an object is stored without its document, and that the Create's document, reachable through Object.activities, still holds it as received. A test reproduces the reviewer's case with 70 unrelated object values before the object. #120 (comment) The contributor chose the best effort direction over refusing such a Create and handed the plan to Claude Code, which implemented the comments, documentation, and test. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5-5
GraphQL served every stored activity and object to anyone, so a Create
a remote actor sent to one local actor without Public addressing could
be read anonymously through Activity.document, Object.contentHtml, and
Object.document, while Activity.deliveries protected only the delivery
history. The public policy for locally created objects had widened to
what other servers send.
Received content is an inbox's, which ActivityPub filters by the
requester's permission (5.2) and opens without authentication only when
addressed to the public (5.6). The new readableResource() predicate
decides what a viewer may read:
- An activity of a remote actor is readable when it is addressed to
the public, or by accepted members of a local instance whose
accepted inbound delivery is linked to it.
- An object of a remote actor is readable when it is addressed to the
public, or when an activity the viewer may read refers to it.
- Administrators read everything, and activities and objects of local
actors stay readable whatever their addressing.
The full public IRI, as:Public, and Public count as the public, shared
with the classification rules. node and nodes, Resource.detail, and
Activity.object return null for what the viewer may not read, and
Actor.objects, Object.activities, and Collection.items with their
totalCount filter it in SQL before paging, so that cursors and counts
do not tell of it. Membership reuses viewableInstance(), which moves
with memberInstances() from builder.ts to readable.ts to avoid an
import cycle. The schema descriptions and the README state the rule.
#120 (comment)
The contributor decided to keep remote content without Public
addressing private and to implement it in this pull request, and asked
Claude Code to implement it. Claude Code wrote the predicate, its
application, the tests, and the documentation.
Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5-5
A remote object used to be readable when any activity the viewer may read referred to it. Since an object IRI received again keeps its first snapshot, a later public Create carrying another version of the same object, or one received by another instance, exposed content that had been addressed to a single local actor. Each object row now records the activity that carried its snapshot, and a remote object is readable only when it is addressed to the public or the viewer may read that activity. The first-snapshot policy stays: ActivityPub 7.3 makes Update, not another Create with the same id, the way to change an object. An activity already stored is now refused before its object is written, so that the same activity naming another object never trips the new unique constraint. #120 (comment) Claude Code implemented the plan the user wrote with it for this review, including the migration, the storage and access changes, and the regression tests. The user reviewed and verified the changes. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5-5
An inbound delivery linked to an activity opened that activity, and the object bound to it, to its instance. linkInboundActivity() links a verified delivery by the activity IRI alone, so a second Create with the same activity and object IRIs but other contents, sent to another instance, let that instance's members read the snapshot only the first instance had received. Each inbound delivery now records in carried_snapshot whether its payload is the same JSON value as the stored document, and only such a delivery opens the activity to its instance. A delivery of the same IRI with other contents keeps its activity_id link for debugging, but grants nothing. The migration fills in deliveries linked before it by the same rule, skipping documents jsonb cannot hold. Since that link remains, ActivityDelivery.activity filters the activity by readableResource(), as the other fields reaching activities and objects do, so a delivery opens no more than a node lookup would. The regression test covers the same activity IRI sent to two instances through both node lookups and deliveries. #120 (comment) Claude Code implemented the changes for this review with the user, including the migration, the linking and access changes, and the regression tests, and ran the build, checks, and tests. Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5-5
Activity.expectedClassifications looked up the activity's object without checking whether the viewer may read it, while the sibling Activity.object field did. A public activity referring to an object stored from a private one thus exposed the hidden object's addressing through its classifications. The field now runs the same isReadableResource() check first and returns an empty list for an object the viewer cannot read. The regression test reads the classifications of a public activity whose object was stored from a private one: viewers who may not read the object get an empty list, and the receiving instance's member and administrators keep the classifications. AI provenance: Claude Code applied the review fix and wrote the test following the contributor's plan, for the contributor to review. #120 (comment) Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5-5
InboundDeliveryEntry and OutboundDeliveryEntry still accepted
carriedSnapshot, and recordInbound() and recordOutbound() spread it
into the inserted row. linkInboundActivity() only ever set the mark
to true, so a caller-supplied true survived a mismatched, missing, or
null payload, and a mark left from a deleted activity carried over
when the delivery was linked again to another activity stored under
the same IRI.
- carriedSnapshot is no longer part of either recording input, and
both record functions store false whatever the caller passes.
- linkInboundActivity() assigns the computed mark on both match and
mismatch every time it links a delivery.
The regression test records deliveries with a forged true value,
links them with matching, mismatched, unstorable, missing, and null
payloads, and re-links a delivery after its activity is deleted and
another is stored under the same IRI.
AI provenance: Claude Code applied the review fix and wrote the test
following the contributor's plan, for the contributor to review.
#120 (comment)
Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5-5
When a Create refers to its object by IRI, a delivery whose payload
matches the stored activity proves only that it carried the reference,
not the object fetched apart from it, which may differ from fetch to
fetch. readableObject() still opened the stored object to every
instance whose delivery carried the activity, so an instance that
received the same envelope but fetched a redacted version could read
the version another instance fetched.
- objects.fetched records whether the stored document was fetched
rather than taken from the activity.
- The inbox listener notes the object it fetched, whether or not
the Create is stored, and the delivery keeps it as fetched_object.
A queue worker that runs before the inbox request is recorded
leaves it in the KV store for the recorder, as it does for the
received mark.
- carried_object_snapshot marks a delivery that carried the activity
and either took the object from it or fetched it as stored.
linkInboundActivity() decides it with carried_snapshot, and the
new recordFetchedObject() decides both again for a delivery linked
before its listener ran, as a queued duplicate is. Neither record
function takes the mark.
- readableObject() opens an object received by an instance only
through such a delivery; the activity is still opened by
carried_snapshot alone.
The migration cannot tell how a remote object stored before it was
had, so it takes each as fetched; none opens to an instance until a
delivery that fetched it as stored is linked.
The regression test sends the same envelope referring to the object by
IRI to three instances, synchronously and through the queue, serving a
secret version to the first and third and a redacted one to the second.
The second reads the activity but not the object; the first and third
read the secret. Model tests cover evidence arriving before and after
linking, embedded objects, mismatched payloads, unstorable documents,
and forged marks; a migration test covers the backfill.
AI provenance: Claude Code designed and implemented the fix within the
reviewer's direction and wrote the tests, for the contributor to
review.
#120 (comment)
Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5-5
Fedify 2.4.3 fixes GHSA-4qhx-hhwf-8685: "Fixed inboxes accepting signed
activities whose IDs had a different origin from their actors. Such
deliveries now receive `401 Unauthorized` before they can supply
trusted embedded objects or reserve the genuine activity's idempotency
entry." DrFed's acceptance rules for received Create activities rely
on this check, so every @fedify/* package and @fedify/cli move to
2.4.3.
- The test of a verified Create claiming an IRI on another origin is
no longer todo. Fedify reports this refusal as verificationFailed
with verified attempts, the reason a failed HTTP signature also
gets, so the delivery's error is the body of Fedify's 401 response
rather than a reason of its own. DrFed does not infer one from the
body or check the origins again. The test also checks the status
code and the verified HTTP signature attempt.
- The federation README states that DrFed relies on Fedify 2.4.3 or
later for the origin check.
AI provenance: Claude Code updated the test and README following the
contributor's plan, for the contributor to review.
https://github.com/fedify-dev/fedify/security/advisories/GHSA-4qhx-hhwf-8685
Assisted-by: Claude Code:claude-opus-5-5
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Sorry that this review has stretched across so many rounds. I hope this can be the final one; I have included the relevant invariants and regression cases in the remaining comments so they can be addressed together without another piecemeal follow-up.
| and ${remoteObjects.activityId} is not null | ||
| and ( | ||
| not ${remoteActivity(remoteObjects.activityId)} | ||
| or ${addressedPublicly(remoteObjects.activityId)} |
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Do not inherit a public carrier's visibility for an object fetched by IRI.
addressedPublicly(remoteObjects.activityId) currently opens every stored object whose first carrying activity is public. That is correct when the object was embedded, because the public activity contains the stored object document. It is not correct when remoteObjects.fetched is true: in that case the public activity contains only an IRI, while the stored document came from a separate, possibly authenticated fetch.
I reproduced this through a personal inbox with Fedify 2.4.3's authenticated document loader. The remote endpoint returned a privately addressed Note only after verifying the receiving actor's signed GET. The enclosing Create was addressed to Public and referred to the Note by IRI. After synchronous or queued ingestion, an anonymous viewer and a member of an unrelated instance could read the fetched Note through its node, Activity.object.detail, classifications, and the author's object connection. The stored row had fetched = true; the Note itself was not addressed to Public.
Please make provenance part of the authorization rule. A remote object should be readable when the object itself is public; when an authorized instance has a delivery whose carriedObjectSnapshot proves that instance saw the stored version; or, only for an embedded object, when its actual carrying activity is public. A public envelope proves that its URI reference was published, not that the separately fetched representation was.
This distinction should remain centralized in readableResource() so node lookups, Resource.detail, Activity.object, classifications, relationship connections, and their counts cannot drift apart. While changing the predicate, please preserve these invariants:
- A publicly addressed embedded object remains public even when its own addressing is private.
- A fetched object addressed to Public remains public independently of its carrier.
- A receiving member retains access when that delivery's fetched document matches the stored snapshot.
- Matching only the activity envelope never authorizes a fetched object.
- A different or missing fetched document, a later public activity, and an altered duplicate do not widen the first snapshot's audience.
- Administrators and the existing policy for locally authored objects remain unchanged.
- Legacy remote objects conservatively backfilled with
fetched = truestay fail-closed unless another independent permission applies.
Please test the cross-product of embedded/fetched, public/private carrier, public/private object, matching/different/missing fetched snapshots, synchronous/queued ingestion, and anonymous/unrelated/receiving/admin viewers. In particular, assert both direct nodes and indirect surfaces such as Activity.object, expectedClassifications, connection edges, and totalCount; a field-level patch would otherwise leave the same disclosure through another path.
| where ${remoteObjects.id} = ${id} | ||
| and ${remoteObjects.activityId} is not null | ||
| and ( | ||
| not ${remoteActivity(remoteObjects.activityId)} |
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Treat a missing carrying Activity as closed, not local.
not remoteActivity(remoteObjects.activityId) also becomes true when no activities row exists for that resource ID. Because objects.activity_id references resources.id, deleting only the typed Activity row can leave the resource and pointer in place. I reproduced a privately addressed remote object changing from hidden to anonymously readable after deleting its activities row. This contradicts the comment above that an object whose carrying activity is gone stays closed.
There is no current application path that deletes only an Activity row, so this is a lower-priority schema-state case. It should still be closed while this predicate is being corrected, because absence is not evidence that a carrier is local. Please express the local-carrier case positively by requiring an existing Activity row whose actor is local, or make the foreign key preserve that invariant. If the foreign key is moved to activities.id, account for the current insertion order: some creation paths establish the resource and object before inserting the typed Activity row.
The broader design rule here is that every permission branch should require affirmative evidence. not exists(remote row) combines “known local” with “missing or inconsistent,” which turns partial deletion, migration mistakes, and future cleanup code into authorization. The fix should keep local objects readable through their own explicit local-author rule, keep missing/deleted carriers closed, and avoid making a stale carriedObjectSnapshot effective without a live link. Please add a regression test for a missing typed carrier alongside carrier deletion/relinking tests.
| username: accepted.username, | ||
| instanceId: instance.id, | ||
| inboxUrl: accepted.inboxUrl, | ||
| document: await actor.toJsonLd(), |
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Preserve the remote actor's declared followers IRI for classification.
The newly stored actor document retains its declared followers value, but this insertion does not populate any normalized metadata that classificationAuthor() reads. That function consults only actor.collectionReferences, so a newly ingested remote actor is classified as if it declared no followers collection.
I reproduced this with a signed Create whose actor declares the nonconventional followers IRI https://remote.example/collections/alice-fans, with both the Activity and Object addressed to that IRI. The stored actor document still contained the declaration and collectionReferences was empty. An authorized member received Mastodon direct and Misskey specified; passing the declared followers IRI to the existing classifiers produces private and followers. A conventional ${actorIri}/followers path partly hides the bug through Misskey's fallback, while Mastodon is still wrong.
Please carry the followers IRI from the already parsed and authenticated actor into the normalized data used by classification. Do not repair this only by guessing ${actorIri}/followers, since ActivityPub actors may declare another URI. Also avoid reading a literal followers property from arbitrary raw JSON without accounting for JSON-LD aliases. A nullable normalized followers IRI on the actor, or another representation that does not claim an unfetched endpoint is a fully known Collection, would keep the distinction clear.
The implementation should preserve the actor's first-snapshot/reuse policy rather than silently updating an existing actor on every delivery. It should not promote an unfetched followers endpoint to a typed collection if that can create resource-kind or ownership conflicts. Missing followers must retain the current null behavior and Misskey fallback, hidden objects must still return no classifications, and the Mastodon/Misskey differences for followers in to versus cc must remain intact.
Please cover first ingestion and actor reuse; conventional, custom, and absent followers IRIs; followers in to and only in cc; Public precedence; authorized and unauthorized viewers; and both synchronous and queued ingestion. This should test the stored ingestion path, not only the pure classification helpers, because the defect is the missing metadata between those layers.
3 participants
Fixes #88.
Createthat Fedify authenticated when its object is aNoteor anArticleon the actor's origin and attributed to it (FEP-fe34). The activity and object are stored as received, and an IRI already stored is never overwritten.activity_deliveries.activity_idlinks each verified, 2xx inbound delivery to the activity its IRI names, duplicates included, and each outbound delivery to the activity it sends.Activity.deliveries, filtered to readable instances before paging, andActivityDelivery.activity.preferredUsernameas received, soActor.username andActor.handle` become nullable.One test is
todountil DrFed updates to the next Fedify security release.Verified with
mise run build,mise run check, andmise run test.AI disclosure: Claude Code (claude-opus-5-5) implemented the user's plan and review fixes and drafted this description; Codex (gpt-6-astra) reviewed it. The user reviewed and verified the changes.